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Commercial mobile forensic vendors continue to use and rely upon outdated physical
acquisition techniques in their products. As newmobile devices are introduced and storage
capacities trend upward, so will the time it takes to perform physical forensic acquisitions,
especially when performed over limited bandwidth means such as Universal Serial Bus
(USB). We introduce an automated differential forensic acquisition technique and algo-
rithm that uses baseline datasets and hash comparisons to limit the amount of data sent
from a mobile device to an acquisition endpoint. We were able to produce forensically
validated bit-for-bit copies of device storage in signiﬁcantly reduced amounts of time
compared to commonly available techniques. For example, using our technique, we suc-
cessfully achieved an average imaging rate of under 7 min per device for a corpus of
actively used, real-world 16 GB Samsung Galaxy S3 smartphones. Current commercially
available mobile forensic kits would typically take between one to 3 h to yield the same
result. Details of our differential forensic imaging technique, algorithm, testing procedures,
and results are documented herein.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Performing a physical forensic acquisition for Android™
devices usually requires the device to be booted into one of
the following environments:
 Custom bootloader
 Custom recovery mode
 Normal mode with root access.
In any of these modes, physical acquisition techniques
need to execute code on a target mobile device, which
creates in-memory, bit-for-bit copies of the device that are
sent to a receiving service. In most commercial toolkits,
data is typically sent over a Universal Serial Bus (USB)
interface to a connected hardware device or server (e.g.,
laptop or desktop). USB 2.0 has a maximum transmissionx: þ1 703 983 1002.
ier Ltd. This is an open accrate of 480 Mb/s but rarely achieves speeds of more than
320 Mb/s (Spector, 2014).
Full physical forensic acquisitions can be time-intensive,
sometimes taking hours to complete. Acquisition times are
largely dependent on device processor speeds, cable types
used, and the amount of data transferred. At the time of
writing, the largest Android devices available on themarket
were 128 GB (Florin, 2015). As devices continue to grow in
size, the times tophysicallyacquire themwill likely increase.
In some circumstances, such as time-sensitive opera-
tions at crime scenes or border crossings, having a rapid
physical acquisition capability for mobile devices could be
critical in resolving a situation. Currently, in these situa-
tions, a forensic investigator may instead opt to perform a
logical device acquisition to save time. Not having a phys-
ical image available during an examination may open
questions about missing data, as logical acquisitions do not
capture disarranged or deleted ﬁles, and in some cases may
not preserve ﬁle timestamps.
Our research focuses on reducing the amount of data
that needs to be transferred during the physical acquisitioness article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
1 Devices used by Yang et al.: LG® G3™ (F400S, D851), Optimus G™
(F180S, E975), R3 (IM-A850S), Iron2 (IM-A910S), and Nexus™ 4/5 (E960,
D821).
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ﬁnal product can be the same as that of a traditional
acquisition tool: a complete physical forensic image. We
utilized prior research to develop a prototype software
agent named hawkeye, which uses differential analysis and
runs within an Android custom bootloader or recovery
mode to acquire a physical forensic image.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section (Related work) covers related work; Section
(Corpus of phone images) discusses the phone image
corpus used by hawkeye; Section (Hawkeye) contains
hawkeye implementation details, including the algorithm
used; Section (Experimentation) contains experiment
procedures and results; Section (Discussion) includes a
discussion area; and Section (Conclusion) concludes with a
summary and some proposed future work.
Related work
The Hawkeye project is an extension of the Periodic
Mobile Forensics (PMF) system (Guido et al., 2013); how-
ever, it targets a different use case (e.g., a crime scene) and
is speciﬁcally designed to improve device acquisition
speeds. The hawkeye agent is designed to operate as a client
within the overall PMF system architecture, which is
referenced heavily within this work. Both systems use
differential forensic analysis, as formally deﬁned by Gar-
ﬁnkel, Nelson, and Young (Garﬁnkel et al., 2012). The
original PMF agent has operated on a variety of mobile
devices running Android 2.2þ, and there is no reason
foreseen that the hawkeye agent, using the lessons learned
building PMF compatibility, should not be considered
equally compatible with modern mobile devices.
Laurenson et al. applied and automated the work done
by Garﬁnkel, Nelson, and Young to collect and distribute
application software artifacts in a reference set that they
termed application proﬁles (Laurenson et al., 2015). While
their purpose and implementation differ, there are many
similarities found in building Hawkeye's baseline hash list
and corresponding data storage in PMF. We will describe
several mechanisms built into PMF (Guido et al., 2013) for
generating these hashes.
Gurjar et al. (2015) compared the runtime efﬁciency of
common hashing algorithms (MD5, SHA-family) and their
implementations on Windows® and Linux®. In their work,
they found that MD5 performed best on bothWindows and
Linux. Hawkeye uses MD5 as its hash algorithm because of
its speed. The risk of constructed collisions using MD5 is
not relevant for the scope of our work.
The method of using hash maps to discriminate known-
good ﬁles is well known in the forensics community,
although it is not typically implemented in physical
acquisition tools. This fact holds true in the commercial
mobile forensic acquisition tools that were tested as part of
our work. One of the notable contributions of the Hawkeye
work is the implementation of differential analysis,
enabling Hawkeye to only hash a fraction of a device's
storage, leading to signiﬁcant time savings.
Watkins et al. (2009) previously developed Teleporter.
The hawkeye agent incorporates a hashing comparison
technique similar to that of Teleporter; however, both thepurpose and overall system design differ signiﬁcantly. Tel-
eporter's purpose is to enable transport of a minimal
amount of data from hard drives when faced with limited
bandwidth environments, sometimes over large distances,
and it was designed to identify both known ﬁles and pre-
viously recorded blocks of data. Hawkeye's purpose is to
acquire a full disk image from a target mobile device and
does not have requirements to interpret any ﬁlesystems or
storage content. Some partitions of an Android device are
structured in proprietary or undocumented formats;
Hawkeye acquires them all and makes no attempt to un-
derstand them; that is left for the PMF system (Guido et al.,
2013). Similarly, Grier and Richard (2015) use sifting col-
lectors to identify and acquire only the regions of a disk that
have forensic value. Their research limits the amount of
device data imaged and does not result in complete bit for
bit copies produced by Hawkeye or other mobile forensic
tools. Grier and Richard's approach is similar to Teleporter
in that they interpret ﬁlesystems to identify ﬁles and they
note that their methods are not suitable for unknown
ﬁlesystems.
Garﬁnkel et al. (2010) performed forensic analysis at the
block and sector level. They developed algorithms to
identify fragments of ﬁle formats on a storage device and
showed that contents of a storage device can be deter-
mined with high accuracy using statistical sampling.
Hawkeye uses hash representations of much larger blocks
of storage compared to (Garﬁnkel et al., 2010), primarily to
tradeoff the number of required hash comparisons per-
formed to the amount of data transmitted over the wire.
Statistical sampling to determine mobile storage contents
could be complementary during forensic analysis of the
mobile device images that Hawkeye collects.
Mobile forensic acquisitions are often considered “live
acquisitions” because they rely on a target device's running
kernel. Many commercially available mobile phone kits use
live acquisition techniques to take one-time logical or
physical images of a target device (Lessard and Kessler,
2010). Vidas, Zhang, and Christin (2011) developed a
more generalized acquisition method that requires no prior
knowledge of phone content. Son et al. (2013) studied the
recovery mode method formally introduced by Vidas,
Zhang, and Christin and found that a device's userdata
partition maintained its integrity during the “recovery
mode” acquisition. Recovery mode is a preferred environ-
ment for hawkeye to execute in because it enables the tool
to operate on many different Android devices, provides
access to Android API functions, and temporarily disables
all wireless functionality of the mobile device.
Yang et al. (2015) demonstrated a new method of
acquiring a device through the Android update protocols of
some devices' bootloaders. They tested a variety of 32 GB
Android devices1 and found that their method was signif-
icantly faster than the Cellebrite® UFED 4PC. They stated
that their method took 30 min and UFED 4PC took 120 min
on average. Their results inspired the optimization and
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niques into Hawkeye. Note that the devices used by Yang
et al. were newer and more powerful than the phones used
by the Hawkeye research team. We chose to use Samsung
Galaxy S3s for availability reasons: we already had access to
a corpus of Galaxy S3 device images populated with real-
world data.Corpus of phone images
The PMF project originally sought to improve the state
of enterprise mobile device monitoring. It was designed to
discover malicious users, masquerading users, and mali-
cious applications in an enterprise (Guido et al., 2013).
In the fall of 2013, in a collaborative effort with Purdue
University's Department of Computer and Information
Technology (CIT), PMF's capabilities were deployed in a
simulated enterprise environment (Guido et al., in press).
The environment consisted of 34 mobile devices, each
operated by a unique human subject volunteer on the Pur-
due campus over a period of three months. Each volunteer
was providedwith an acceptable use policy, some deceptive
instructions designed to steer normal behavior, and a Sam-
sungGalaxyS3mobiledevicewith theoriginal PMFsoftware
agent installed. The agent, named tractorbeam, was conﬁg-
ured to communicatewirelessly with a cloud instance every
24 h, transmitting changed device storage as encrypted bi-
nary data. The server de-duplicated and stored thedata until
it was collected in a secure enclave for analysis purposes.
During the Purdue experiment, we were able to build a
corpus of forensic images of the mobile devices used by the
volunteers. Over the three-month period, we regularly
stored the transferred forensic image data as the volunteers
continued to use their provided devices. The ﬁnal corpus
consisted of more than 1100 images from the 34 devices.
The volunteers were instructed to use the devices normally.
We assume that they followed instructions and that their
data is largely uninhibited. Therefore, we feel this corpus
represents a rich dataset of normal device usage and
behavior. Wewere able to provide Hawkeyewith this “real-
world” data to inﬂuence design decisions and verify results.
Thecorpuswas stored inanefﬁcient, de-duplicated format
within PMF's database, delivering signiﬁcant storage space
savings. Utilities were developed for PMF that can interpret
this format and convert images to their raw forms. Among
those utilities was PMF's automated write-back capability,
which was used in the Hawkeye experimentation (Section
Experimentation) to re-populate some of the devices to
physical states recorded during the Purdue experiment.2Hawkeye
The hawkeye agent is a multi-threaded Native C pro-
gram compiled for ARM that is temporarily installed into2 The corpus of images collected during the Purdue experiment were
acquired while the devices were in active use. The images written back to
the devices were potentially not in a stable state. For our purposes, the
state was irrelevant because it was only used to populate the devices with
real-world data.volatile space on a device. The agent uses lists of pre-
computed baseline hashes and partitions in its automated
differential forensic imaging technique. The agent's goal is
to identify and send only necessary storage device blocks to
the backend PMF architecture as quickly as possible. The
“bottleneck” in this process is the transmission of blocks
over the USB link. Alternative ordering of procedures in
Hawkeye's algorithm involving more client and server
communications was explored, but it did not reduce and
sometimes even increased the amount of data having to
traverse the link.Agent work-ﬂow
Hawkeye is meant for a one-time physical acquisition.
When at a crime scene (or other applicable environment),
the following approach should be used:
1. Identify the target mobile device model and verify
Hawkeye support for it.
2. Flash a Team Win Recovery Project (TWRP) custom re-
covery image3 onto the device and boot the custom re-
covery kernel.
3. Connect the target mobile device to the PMF architecture
(e.g., laptop) via USB cable.
4. Execute Hawkeye from the laptop, which temporarily
installs hawkeye to the device's volatile memory, sets up
communications between the client and PMF queuing
service, and starts the hawkeye agent.
The setup process in step 4 above provides the hawkeye
agent with two key pieces of information: a baseline hash
list (discussed in Section Adding device support / baseline
imaging) sent from the laptop, and partition data inter-
preted from reading and processing the device's GUID
Partition Table (GPT). The partition data is provided in a
comma-separated format and includes:
 Path
 Size in bytes
By default, the partition list contains a single entry with
the path /dev/block/mmcblk0. This causes the tool to
perform a full device acquisition. The list can be altered
during the setup process to instead include individual
partitions (e.g., /dev/block/mmcblk0p3, /dev/block/
mmcblk0p20) if the operator onlywants to acquire a subset
of the device storage. The on-device agent parses the
partition list information and calculates individual block
offsets, which are added to a stack for processing. Section
(Per thread algorithm) covers the algorithm used to process
the blocks.3 We compiled and installed our own custom version of a TWRP re-
covery image since we found that TWRP modiﬁes several partitions of a
device by default (i.e., it is not forensically sound). We removed TWRP's
persistence mechanisms and added “read-only” and “no-load” mount
options. The “no-load” option prevents journal loading on ext4 partitions.
TWRP can be found here: https://twrp.me/. Our forensically sound
changes can be provided upon request.
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Adding device support to Hawkeye is a relatively simple
task since it only requires a previously taken image of a
baseline device. A baseline device should be the same or
similar model to that of the target device. A baseline image
canbeused tobuild a baseline set of hashes (further referred
to as a “gold hash list”). These are hashes that a forensic
investigatorwould expect toﬁnd on a target device. This list
can typically include hashes representing portions of stock
operating system (OS) ﬁles, application data, and other
common “read-only” storage areas of a device (e.g., the
baseband, bootloader, boot image, etc.). The gold hash list is
pushed to a target device during theHawkeye setup process
and is loaded into an in-memory hash table, which is
referenced heavily during execution.
For the Hawkeye experiment conducted in Section
(Hawkeye benchmarks), we built our gold hash list from the
baseline imagesof thePurdueexperiment (SectionCorpusof
phone images).We built the list by calculating all the unique
MD5 hashes from each image using blocksizes of 64 KiB and
1 MiB.4 This resulted in roughly 66,000 distinct hashes.
When Hawkeye is used in an operational setting, it is
recommended that the hash list be prebuilt to include one
or more Android versions per particular mobile device
hardware. Having a wider variety of baseline devices and
OS versions represented in the gold hash list will improve
the overall imaging times. For example, the Galaxy S3 SGH-
I747model used in our Purdue experiment can run Android
4.04, 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.3, and 4.4, as well as custom third-party
OSs such as Cyanogenmod.5 Using baseline images from
each of these versions to form a gold hash list allows
hawkeye to skip sending data from certain storage areas of
any Galaxy S3 SGH-I747 target device since those storage
areas are already known.
To create a gold hash list, forensic images of the mobile
devices’ stock images need to be stored in the PMF data-
base. These images can be acquired directly through PMF/
Hawkeye or imported if another tool (e.g., Cellebrite UFED
Touch, UFED 4PC) was used and that tool produced a raw
(i.e., dd) image ﬁle. A list of MD5 hashes are then pulled
from the PMF database and used by Hawkeye.
It is believed that a gold hash list could be produced and
included by commercial mobile forensic kit vendors. Ven-
dors have access to a wide variety of devices and already
use device-speciﬁc acquisition procedures. We theorize
that inclusion of a gold hash list and hawkeye algorithm
would require relatively little additional effort on their
parts and would signiﬁcantly decrease/reduce their prod-
ucts’ physical acquisition times.Fig. 1. hawkeye per thread scanning algorithm.
6 Hawkeye uses a stack instead of a queue, as the order of processingPer thread algorithm
The hawkeye agent uses partition information from a
device's GUID Partition Table (GPT) table to populate a stack4 The blocksize values of 64 KiB and 1 MiB are not arbitrary; an
explanation for their use is provided in Section (Blocksize comparison).
5 More information about Cyanogenmod is available from: http://
www.cyanogenmod.org/.of 1 MiB block offsets. The block offsets are popped from
the stack6 and processed by a thread pool. Hawkeye is
conﬁgured by default to use a thread pool with 10 threads.7
Each thread in the pool performs the algorithm as seen in
Fig. 1.
The Hawkeye algorithm initially calculates the MD5 of
individual blocks with a small blocksize8 and then uses the
search and insert functions to interface with an in-memory
hash table. The hash table contains MD5s from a gold hash
list (Section Adding device support / baseline imaging).
Searches are performed to check for the existence of MD5s
in the hash table. When a hash is not found, it is immedi-
ately inserted into the table and its corresponding full 1
MiB data block is sent.
Using a small initial blocksize to hash a block saves
processing time, as a full block hash is not always needed to
determine if the block has been seen before. This results in
a signiﬁcant performance improvement worth noting. The
following cases present themselves:
 If the hash of the ﬁrst portion of a block is new, it is
guaranteed that the full block has never been seen
before.
 If the hash of the ﬁrst portion of a block is not new (i.e., it
has been seen before and results in a hash match), one
cannot assume that the full block is already known.
In the latter case, the full block hash would be needed
for the determination.When calculating the full block hash,
Hawkeye makes use of the fact that it has already operated
on part of the block. Since it previously calculated the small
block hash, it continues hashing the remaining portion of
the full 1 MiB block without having to rehash the ﬁrst 64
KiB. If the full block hash matches an entry in the table, the
data block is not sent (only its reference data is
transmitted).
A by-product of the Hawkeye algorithm is the allowance
for a limited amount of duplicate block data to be sent. We
do not consider it a design ﬂaw since the number ofblock offsets does not matter.
7 Limited testing on a single Galaxy S3 device conﬁrmed that a range of
10e15 threads was optimal in achieving the fastest runtimes.
8 Smaller blocksizes of 4 KiB and 64 KiB were compared and tested to
see which would yield a faster runtime. We chose to use 64 KiB for
reasons explained in Section (Blocksize comparison).
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noted herein. A duplicate block may be sent because of our
choice to use a small block hash to check if a large block has
been observed previously. Upon ﬁrst occurrence of a small
block hash not previously observed by Hawkeye, the large
block is transmitted but no large block hash is calculated.
Upon encountering a duplicate block, the large hash will be
calculated, but Hawkeye will also unnecessarily transmit
the same block again. This scenario is further broken down
and happens when the following events occur:
1. A 64 KiB block hash is identiﬁed as new (not matching
any hash previously in the hash list), is inserted into the
hash lookup table, and has its corresponding 1 MiB data
block transmitted to the server. The 64 KiB hash is added
to the hash lookup table, but to save processing time, no
1 MiB hash is produced.
2. A duplicate 1 MiB block is encountered later. Its 64 KiB
hash will match an existing hash in the hash lookup
table, which will cause Hawkeye to calculate the 1 MiB
hash. Its 1 MiB hash will not match any hash in the hash
lookup table, prompting the hash to be identiﬁed as new.
The 1 MiB hash will be inserted into the hash lookup
table, and its corresponding 1 MiB block will be trans-
mitted for the second time.
By not performing a full 1 MiB block hash of every block,
we improved our overall performance even when some
duplicate blocks were present. Inserting a calculation of the
1 MiB hash upon ﬁrst observance of a block added over 30 s
on average to Hawkeye's execution time.
Hawkeye does not use compression, nor does it trans-
form the data in any way. Contents are transmitted in a raw
block form. While investigating using Zlib for compression,
the added time to compress and send the data negatively
increased Hawkeye's overall execution time. As such, we
decided to exclude it. We leave investigating alternative
compression utilities for future work.
Server architecture
As mentioned in previous sections, Hawkeye relies on a
PMF server to operate. The server is not a main focus of this
paper; however, its components are brieﬂy covered here for
the sake of completeness.
The PMF server architecture is composed of a PostgreSQL
server, MongoDB server, and RabbitMQ service. Raw blocks
of data are stored single-instanced in PostgreSQL. Full
physical images of devices’ blockdevices can be rebuilt9 from
PostgreSQL. MongoDB stores analytical results of forensic
processes run against rebuilt images from PostgreSQL. Rab-
bitMQ provides message queuing, which continuously lis-
tens for data from a device. For the Hawkeye9 PMF post-acquisition rebuilds are done on demand and typically take
less than 5 min to produce a complete 16 GB image ﬁle from PostgreSQL
on a bare metal Ubuntu®machine (see speciﬁcations described in Section
Hawkeye benchmarks). Optimizations to the rebuild process were left for
future work. The rebuild time was not included in any reported Hawkeye
results because PMF can output this format as needed as part of a post-
acquisition process.experimentation, RabbitMQwas tuned to use 2 MiB buffers,
which improved overall system performance. The PMF sys-
tem (Fig. 2) has been designed to allow for the maximum
numberofUSBdevices runningon the samehost at the same
time. Themaximumnumber varies permachine, depending
on the number of buses and the amount of bandwidth uti-
lizedbyeachdevice. Todate,wehaveonly tested fourdevices
simultaneously and left more expansive testing for future
work. In our limited experience, running multiple devices
simultaneouslyhasnot noticeablyaffectedacquisition times.
Experimentation
Several experiments were performed to determine and
improve theagent's runtime. Theﬁrstexperiment compared
the use of several blocksizes. The second experiment details
queries performed against the Purdue corpus, ﬁndings from
which were used to tune Hawkeye performance. Overall
Hawkeye benchmark testingwas performed and the results
are compared to existing products and techniques. Finally,
speciﬁc features used by Hawkeye were measured for their
contributions to the overall speed improvement.
Blocksize comparison
The blocksizes used in the hawkeye algorithm (Section
Per thread algorithm) are not arbitrary values. The algo-
rithm makes use of two different blocksizes: a small
blocksize and a full blocksize. Tests were performed to
determine which set of blocksizes yielded the fastest
overall runtimes.
In determining an optimal small blocksize, we produced
lists of 64 KiB hashes and 4 KiB hashes from the Purdue
dataset (Section Corpus of phone images). Each list was
provided and used by the hawkeye agent. We found that 64
KiB blocksizes slightly increased the total amount of time
spent hashing a device but also reduced the amount of data
needed to be sent to the PMF server. In most cases, we
found the 64 KiB size to be more efﬁcient due to the
reduced network impact.
Tests to determine an optimal full blocksize were also
performed. We compared blocksizes of 128 KiB, 256 KiB,
512 KiB, 1 MiB, 2 MiB, and 4 MiB. The tests were run using
an empty gold hash list on a heavily populated 16 GB
Samsung Galaxy S3 and a sparsely populated 8 GB Nexus 4.
Results were largely inconsistent and appeared to be data,
device, and server platform dependent. For example, run-
times were all nearly identical on the Nexus 4 regardless of
the blocksize used. On the Samsung Galaxy S3, there were
some indications that a smaller blocksize (128 KiB e 512
KiB) may potentially result in slightly faster runtimes, but
we were unable to identify a single optimal value. We
found that when the same device sends to different server
platforms,10 the optimal blocksize value also changes.
While we recognize the need for further testing and
research in determining the best blocksize, we chose to use
1 MiB for several reasons:10 We conﬁgured two Ubuntu 14.04 servers to listen for hawkeye data,
each with 2 GB RAM. One was a virtual machine; one was bare metal.
Fig. 2. PMF architecture.
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MiB represents a “sweet spot” between the runtimes of
sparsely and heavily populated devices.
 PMF's legacy client uses 1 MiB blocksizes, allowing us
backwards-compatibility. 1 MiB blocksizes previously
proved to be optimal for wireless transmission.
 Some current commercial mobile forensic tools use 1
MiB blocksizes during acquisitions. Keeping a consistent
blocksize may allow for a smoother transition if an
approach like Hawkeye were to be implemented.Corpus examination
An analysis of the data in the Purdue corpus inﬂuenced
design decisions in the hawkeye algorithm. In order to tune
it for maximum performance, queries were performed on
the dataset to determine the:
 Prevalence of “all-zero” blocks
 Frequency of blocks with a 4 KiB/64 KiB gold hash list
match that also needed to be transmitted
 Frequency of duplicate blocks that have not been pre-
viously observed (i.e., the duplicate block sending sce-
nario discussed in Section Per thread algorithm)
Analysis of storage across all devices in the Purdue
corpus revealed a large amount of blocks (blocksize ¼ 111 The number of repeated 1 MiB block patterns drastically declined
after discovering the high prevalence of all-zero blocks in the corpus. No
other block pattern occupied more than 1% of the total blocks observed.MiB) containing all zeros (i.e., NULL characters). We found
that 620,277 of 1,406,104 (44%) blocks were all-zeros.11
When examining the initial baseline images alone, we
found that the all-zeros percentage was higher at 71%
(543,508 of 765,866). The decrease in “all-zero” blocks over
time is predictable, since the volunteers started with near-
stock (baseline) devices and gradually added their unique
content over the course of the experiment. Because there
were still a signiﬁcant number of all-zero blocks on many
devices at the end of the experiment, we decided to
improve the hawkeye algorithm by leveraging a zero block
comparison function.
The comparison function iterates over the entire block
until it ﬁnds a non-zero 4-byte word or determines the
block is all zeros. The function compares 16 bytes at a time
and implements loop unrolling to increase its speed.
We found that the zero block comparison function
evaluates a block of all-zeros signiﬁcantly faster than any
hashing technique. On average, it classiﬁes a block as all-
zeros 252 times faster than an MD5 hash calculation. This
ﬁnding led us to conclude that even if there is no support in
Hawkeye for an unknown mobile device (i.e., no gold hash
list available), Hawkeye can still achieve a speed improve-
ment during the acquisition process, since it will likely
encounter all-zero blocks.
In the hawkeye algorithm (Fig. 1), the most time-
intensive portion is triggered when an examined block is
non-zero, has an initial gold hash list match, and then is
unable to ﬁnd a 1 MiB hash match. These situations are
considered expensive because of the number of lengthy
operations involved: two hashes performed and 1 MiB of
data sent over USB to the server. Findings showed that
when 4 KiB was used as the small blocksize, an average
Table 2
Comparison of existing tool acquisition times of a Samsung Galaxy S3.
Tool/technique Time in seconds
dd/netcat 11,050
Cellebrite UFED Touch 10,800
Magnet Acquire 7260
Cellebrite UFED 4PC 6942
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and transmitted. When the 64 KiB small blocksize was
used, the average range was reduced to 100e300 blocks. As
a result of these ﬁndings, we used a 64 KiB hash size instead
of 4 KiB in the hawkeye algorithm.
Additionally, we calculated the amount of duplicate
blocks that were not part of the gold hash list. Processing
these blocks would cause Hawkeye to transmit data twice
(i.e., the duplicate block sending scenario discussed in
Section Per thread algorithm). We found that the amount of
occurrences across the Purdue corpus was relatively small
(average of less than 100 occurrences). On some images,
duplicate blocks were not present. This provided assur-
ances that the presence of these duplicates should be
considered corner cases that should have negligible effect
on Hawkeye performance.
Hawkeye benchmarks
A series of tests tomeasure the runtime of Hawkeyewere
performed against devices with varying amounts of data.
The ﬁrst set of tests were done on Samsung Galaxy S3
SGH-I747 model devices while connected via USB 2.0 to an
Ubuntu 14.04 virtual machine (VM)with one processor and
2 GiB of RAM. The VM was hosted on a Windows 7 Enter-
prise machine with an Intel® Core™ i7 2.70 GHz processor
and 4 GiB of RAM.
These experiments dealt with real-world devices and
data. We took advantage of the smartphone image corpus
collected during the Purdue experiment (Section Corpus of
phone images). PMF's write-back capability was used to
write images to devices, which were then imaged with
Hawkeye. We tested six selected images, each originating
from a different device. The date of collection factored into
the image selection decisions: wewanted images that were
collected toward the end of the Purdue experiment,
maximizing the amount of usage each device endured.
Table 1 contains a list of the benchmarks seen when
Hawkeye was used to perform physical acquisitions on
these devices.
For the benchmarks in Table 1, the timer was started
when the hawkeye binary began executing and stopped
when all necessary blocks were received by the server. Each
device contained 15,023 total blocks (blocksize ¼ 1 MiB).
Traditional forensic acquisition tools would normally send
all 15,023 blocks to a listening service, taking a signiﬁcant
amount of time. Based on the send times from Table 1,
hawkeye, on average, needs only 389 s (6 min, 29 s) with a
standard deviation of 86 s to transfer all necessary data and
achieve the same result as that of a traditional forensicTable 1
Hawkeye acquisition benchmarks with real data.
Phone ID # Blocks sent
w/Hawkeye
Hawkeye time in
secs (Avg. 3 trials)
4 797 324
15 932 333
29 2143 412
30 3797 528
33 309 302
34 2567 434acquisition tool. Note that the images acquired by Hawkeye
were validated through hash comparisons and matched
with those of the original images from the corpus.
Known blocks and all-zero blocks were not sent to the
server; however, all blocks did have reference data trans-
mitted. The time to send all the references was minimal
(less than 1 s). Reference data included items such as an
MD5 hash and an index value.
The second set of tests compared Hawkeye acquisition
times to existing tools and techniques; results are listed in
Table 2. Existing tools and techniques include Cellebrite
UFED 4PC v4.5.0.307, Cellebrite UFED Touch v4.1.0.367,
MSAB XRY v6.16, Magnet Acquire v2.0.0.0699, Oxygen
Forensic® Extractor v8.0.3.199, and dd/netcat over ADB.12
Each tool was used to physically acquire the same well-
populated13 16 GB Samsung Galaxy S3. While the same
phone was used throughout these tests, the state of it
varied per tool. Some tools required the phone to be booted
into normal mode, which inherently makes changes to a
device's storage. Other tools ran in the phone's recovery
mode or through the bootloader, which are more forensi-
cally sound. Due to the variable phone states, some of the
acquired images slightly differed from each other. Wewere,
however, able to verify exact hash matches among images
produced by Cellebrite, XRY, and Hawkeye/PMF, since they
similarly produced a raw bit-for-bit copy of the device
storage without making changes to the target device. The
collection platforms also varied by tool. Most tools were
run on the aforementioned Windows machine; Hawkeye
was executed on a bare metal 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 laptop
with 2 GB RAM and a 1.73 GHz Intel Core i7 processor. The
times in Table 2 were provided by each tested tool after a
successful acquisition. If the acquisition time was not re-
ported by a tool (as was the case for the non-commercial
tools/techniques), the UNIX time command or Windows
PowerShell Measure-Command output was used.
A third set of tests were performed on Samsung Galaxy
S3 and Nexus 4 devices to measure Hawkeye's best and
worst case scenarios. For the best case scenario, the devices
were baselined (99% of the unused userdata and cache
partitions were ﬁlled with NULL blocks). This enabled us to
measure the core speed of the hawkeye algorithm. No raw
block data was sent to the server since the gold hash listOxygen Forensic Extractor 4415
MSAB XRY 3240
Hawkeye 635
12 A blocksize of 1 MiB was used with dd. Instructions on how to use dd
and netcat over ADB can be found here: http://freeandroidforensics.
blogspot.com/2014/08/live-imaging-android-device.html.
13 The tested device's data partition was over 70% full of user-generated
content, most of which consisted of unique JPG ﬁles.
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devices. The results of the test can be found in Table 3. Note
that the speeds listed in the “Baseline” column in Table 3
are not representative of real-world scenarios, since no
user-generated content was present on the devices.
In measuring the worst-case scenario for Hawkeye, the
devices were ﬁlled with random data. Nearly every block of
these devices would need to be sent (excluding blocks con-
taining known OS data). The devices were prepped by ﬁlling
99% of their unused userdata and cache partitions with
random data from /dev/urandom. Results of these tests out-
performed all existing solutions and can also be found in
Table 3.
Finally, three additional tests were performed to specif-
ically measure the speed improvement gained through our
use of threads, Hawkeye's hash comparison function, and its
zero block comparison function. The tests were performed
using a baseline Galaxy S3 with a capacity of 16 GB (this was
the same baseline device used in Table 3). The ﬁrst test
involved the removal of the hash comparison function, zero
block comparison function, and threading from Hawkeye,
resulting in an acquisition time of 1164 s. In the second test,
threads were reinstated but the hash comparison and zero
block comparison functionswere removed. This resulted in a
runtime of 957 s. In the last test, only the zero block com-
parison function was removed from Hawkeye (threading
and the hash comparison function were used). The resulting
time to acquire the image was 348 s. These results are listed
in Table 4 and analyzed in Section (Analysis of results).
Discussion
Discussion points herein include an analysis of experi-
ment results, device encryption implications, and the
applicability of Hawkeye to other platforms.
Analysis of results
The Hawkeye runtimes displayed in Tables 1e3 mark
signiﬁcant improvements over current approaches used by
mobile forensics tools to perform physical acquisitions.
Table 1 shows that acquisitions of a common device con-
taining real-world data can be acquired in under 7 min.
Table 2 emphasizes that Hawkeye is at least 5X faster than
other compared commercial tools or techniques. Table 3
highlights the theoretical minimum and maximum run-
times for two different devices.Table 3
Hawkeye best-case /worst-case benchmarks.
Device Capacity Baseline (secs) Random-ﬁlled (secs)
Nexus 4 8 GB 93 401
Galaxy S3 16 GB 265 891
Table 4
Measuring speed gain of various Hawkeye features.
Device All features
removed (secs)
Threading
only (secs)
Threading and hash
comparison function (secs)
Galaxy S3 1164 957 348The maximum runtime results in Table 3 greatly
exceeded our initial expectations. We hypothesized that
devices ﬁlled with random data would perform at or near
the speeds of current tools. The results show otherwise and
further emphasize that differential analysis is not the only
major factor in improving the agent's runtime. In this case,
differential analysis was minimally effective against the
userdata and cache partitions since they were mostly ﬁlled
with random data. Although the impact of using differen-
tial analysis was minimized, Hawkeye was still found to
achieve signiﬁcantly faster acquisitions than current tools.
We surmise that Hawkeye's native code implementation
and code optimizations led to the majority of the speed
improvements achieved.
The ﬁnal three tests from Section (Hawkeye
benchmarks) allowed us to speciﬁcally measure the per-
formance gained through the use of threading, the hash
comparison function, and the zero block comparison
function in our baseline Samsung Galaxy S3. The results
emphasize how effective these techniques are in reducing
the physical acquisition time. We found that by using a
combination of all three features, Hawkeye achieved a
speed improvement of 15 min. This was calculated by
subtracting the time of the full featured run (265 sdTable 3
baseline test) from the time of the run that had all features
removed (1164 s). Furthermore, we calculated each fea-
ture's individual contribution to the speed improvement.
Threading accounted for 207 s, the hash comparison
function reduced the time by 609 s, and the zero block
comparison function caused an 83-s improvement. Note
that the time gained from the zero comparison function
depends entirely on the number of all-zero blocks in a
device. In this case, the device tested contained many all-
zero blocks. While these three factors represent signiﬁ-
cant time-saving elements, they do not account for the full
difference in speed between Hawkeye and other compared
tools and techniques. This fact lends support to our afore-
mentioned theory that our native code implementation
and code optimizations were the most effective factors in
achieving faster acquisition times.Working with encryption
Mobile devices with encryption enabled do not prevent
Hawkeye from performing physical acquisitions. Hawkeye
makes no distinction on a device's encryption status during
its operation. Note that on Android and iOS devices,
encryption settings only apply to the userdata partitions
(Mayer and Suarez; Edwards, 2016). Partitions such as sys-
tem (Android and iOS), cache (Android only), and others
remain unencrypted.
With the release of TWRP 3.0, a user's passcode can be
entered to decrypt the userdata partition of an Android
device in recovery mode.14 This action would enable
Hawkeye to acquire the userdata partition in an unen-
crypted form. If Hawkeye acquires encrypted data, the14 TWRP's userdata decryption feature is device dependent. Full TWRP
3.0 release notes can be found here: https://twrp.me/site/update/2016/
02/05/twrp-3.0.0-0-released.html.
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acquisition phase, which may pose some challenges
depending on the target device's hardware and OS version.
Applicability to non-Android platforms
While the majority of our work on Hawkeye has been
tested on Android, the tool's underlying technical acquisi-
tion techniques can be applied to a wider variety of envi-
ronments and platforms such as iOS, system-on-chip (SoC)
devices, and hard drives. The approach should be viable as
long as a Hawkeye implementation has the ability to read
the storage on a device of interest.
A Hawkeye implementation for iOS would need to read
the blockdevice ﬁles in the /dev directory. On the iPhone 5,
the /dev/disk0s1s1 and /dev/disk0s1s2 blockdevices
represent the system and data partitions, respectively. A
jailbroken iPhone would allow the permissions necessary
for Hawkeye to perform a physical acquisition. Similar ap-
proaches could be applied to other platforms and
environments.
Conclusion
Using a variety of techniques which deliver signiﬁcant
time savings, we were able to develop an imaging agent
that can physically acquire a mobile device faster than any
current tool found commercially or in research. The appli-
cations for our approach include crime scenes, border
crossings, and any other situation where performing a
mobile forensic acquisition is time-sensitive.
Our results indicate that commercial vendors that have
developed mobile acquisition capabilities would beneﬁt
from adding functionality similar to Hawkeye. Further-
more, it is theorized that commercial forensic kit makers
can perform all necessary preparation for their supported
mobile devices in a similar fashion to what is currently
done today, leading to an easy adoption of the methods
described herein.
The potential impact on mobile forensics in general
would be signiﬁcant, as dramatic speed-ups during the
acquisition phase would allow data to get into the hands of
analysts more quickly. Analysts would then have the op-
portunity to perform a more thorough examination using a
physical image instead of a logical ﬁle set.
Future work involves more testing and expansion of
several areas within the Hawkeye project. Acquisitions
performed on devices that support USB 3.0 were not tested
as part of our experiments; future research should be
conducted to discover any performance differences over
such a mechanism. Testing devices larger than 16 GB were
also left for future experimentation. Work to acquire and
provide more thorough baseline data (i.e., gold hash lists)
remains. Further exploration of the use of full diskencryption should be explored as it becomes more ubiq-
uitous. Also, as devices grow in storage size, compression
should be reexamined. Finally, the techniques found in
Hawkeye can be expanded and applied to other forensic
areas besides mobile forensics.Acknowledgments
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